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Using Nonprofits to Serve Charitable 
Goals of Social Businesses in the United 
States: Circumventing the Lack of 
Recognition of the Social Business Model 
in the Federal Tax Code 
 
Gautam Jagannath* 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Is the pursuit of profit always contrary to the public good?
1
 Social 
businesses are for-profit businesses focused on pursuing their charitable 
goal rather than maximizing profits.
2
 Often, they cater solely to their 
social mission. These social enterprises opt to maximize their social 
benefit while nevertheless producing a profit.
3
 One area in which social 
businesses have garnered attention is microfinance. In 2005, the New 
York Times reported that there were less than three hundred American-
based microfinance companies offering microloans.
4
 Today, the ubiquity 
of microfinance is evidenced by the measure of social concern for the so-
called “indigent third-world.”5 However, the burgeoning excitement 
 
        *  J.D. Candidate, Northeastern University School of Law (2012). The Author would 
like to thank his mother for starting Amba, a social business, his partner Emily Abraham 
for her tireless editing and concern for this Article, and Professor Beth Elliott for her 
feedback. 
1. Darryll K. Jones, Restating the Private Benefit Doctrine for A Brave New World, 
1 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 4 (2003). 
2. See Muhammad Yunus, Founder, Grameen Bank, 2006 Nobel Peace Prize 
Lecture (Dec. 10, 2006), available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laure 
ates/2006/yunus-lecture-en.html#. 
3. What Is Social Enterprise?, SOC. ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, https://se-
alliance.org/what-is-social-enterprise (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). This form of business 
is quite old—predating capitalism—and has origins in the natural economy vis-à-vis 
bartering. 
4. Amy Zipkin, For Some, a Little Loan Goes a Long Way, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 
2005, at C5. 
5. See Kentaro Toyama, Lies, Hype and Profit: The Truth About Microfinance, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 28, 2011, 11:07 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/ 
01/lies-hype-and-profit-the-truth-about-microfinance/70405/. 
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about microfinance raised an issue in American law: is the industry 
charitable and should it be considered tax-exempt?
6
 In considering the 
value of these organizations, it should be noted that, while microlending 
organizations represent a form of social business, they are certainly not 
the final solution to poverty.
7
 As states only recently begin to recognize 
social enterprise, the United States federal government is still stuck with 
traditional notions of charitable entities.
8
 
Social enterprise is older than microfinance and is ubiquitous albeit 
unrecognized.
9
 Literally hundreds of companies are operated as social 
businesses in America.
10
 Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus of the 
Grameen Bank contributed to, but did not “create,” the social enterprise 
business model.
11
 Examples from recent times are varied and diverse, 
including diners, rural clinics, start-ups, and public corporations.
12
 There 
is a strong potential for these companies to do good, and even perhaps 
change the face of capitalism.
13
 While this may be the case, the legal 
separation between nonprofits and for-profits continues to enforce the 
stale notion that they cannot be interrelated.
14
 Legislators have fixed 
notions about what a nonprofit should do, and do not see for-profit 
values as being an essential part of a nonprofit business model. As a 
 
6. Kiva, for example, is an American based microfinance corporation that is wholly 
based upon individual contributions and does not itself earn any interest. See About Us, 
KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). 
7. See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflection in a Distant Mirror: Why the West Has 
Misperceived the Grameen Bank’s Vision of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 217 
(2005). 
8. Stephanie Strom, A Quest for Hybrid Companies that Profit, but Can Tap 
Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2011, at B1. 
9. Julia Taylor Kennedy, A Conversation with Microfinance Pioneer Susan Davis, 
POL’Y INNOVATIONS (Jul. 5, 2011), http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/audio/data/00 
0615. 
10. John Tozzi, America’s Most Promising Social Entrepreneurs 2011, BUS. WK. 
(Jun. 22, 2011, 2:24 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/jun2011/sb201 
10621_158462.htm. 
11. This is not to diminish the fact that Yunus is a key actor in modern 
microfinance. See Yunus, supra note 2. 
12. See DENNIS R. YOUNG, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE IN THE UNITED STATES: ALTERNATE 
IDENTITIES AND FORMS (2001), available at http://www.community-
wealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/social/paper-young.pdf. Apparently, even Ben & 
Jerry’s Homemade, Inc. was at one time a social business. Id. at 5. 
13. Muhammad Yunus et al., Building Social Business Models: Lessons from the 
Grameen Experience 22 (HEC Paris, Working Paper No. 913, 2009). 
14. See e.g., P.L.L. Scholarship Fund v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. 196, 200 (1984); I.R.S. 
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201115026 (Jan. 19, 2011). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/7
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result, social businesses live on the fringe of American corporate law.
15
 
Social businesses are organized as traditional for-profit 
organizations, such as corporations. This is the reality because 
limitations would befall them if they were organized as tax-exempt 
organizations.
16
 One such problem recognized by social business owners 
is that exempt organizations are limited by their operating budgets.
17
 
Unlike social businesses, nonprofits tend to be dependent on charitable 
donations for a large percentage of their work.
18
 The social business is 
not constrained in this manner through the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) 
because it is legally indistinguishable from any other for-profit.
19
 While 
this provides great freedom for the social business, it is also unfortunate 
because social businesses are not conferred any tax benefits or incentives 
for the public service they perform.
20
 While the concept of the social 
business is quite novel in American law, its potential is so high that it 
should be rapidly embraced by the business sector. The problem lies only 
in the implementation. 
If social businesses were tax exempt, they would nevertheless be 
taxed under federal tax law. This is because of the Unrelated Business 
Income Tax (UBIT) rules, as well as the Excess Benefit Tax (EBT), 
which seek to keep enterprises in line with their charitable goals.
21
 Social 
businesses are not bound by the non-distribution rule, can expand 
operations, and their executives are able to reap the financial rewards of 
productivity.
22
 This level of discretion would be unacceptable for federal 
tax-exempts. Accordingly, social businesses are wary about taking on the 
risk of becoming an exempt, which includes liability. Such businesses do 
not desire heightened governmental scrutiny arising from seeking exempt 
 
15. MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS: THE NEW KIND OF 
CAPITALISM THAT SERVES HUMANITY’S MOST PRESSING NEEDS 117 (2010). 
16. See Marci Alboher, A Social Solution, Without Going the Nonprofit Route, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009, at B5. See also James R. Hines, Jr. et al., The Attack on Nonprofit 
Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179 (2010) (discussing the 
implications of offering nonprofit benefits to socially active for-profit organizations). 
17. Shelly Banjo, Report Faults Nonprofits on Service, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2010, 
at A28. 
18. Yunus, supra note 2. 
19. Social businesses are organized just like any other for-profit, generally in a 
corporate form. 
20. See generally FAQs, YUNUS & YOUTH TUBE, http://yytube.net/index.php?option 
=com_jefaq&view=faq&Itemid=57 (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). 
21. Hines et al., supra note 16, at 1190. 
22. YUNUS & YOUTH TUBE, supra note 20. 
3
JAGANNATH_Formatted_Finalv2 4/11/2012  7:39 PM 
242 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32:1 
status. 
As a result, nonprofit exempt organizations are not a suitable 
business vehicle to pursue the desires of social enterprise.
23
 Social 
businesses generally require tremendous capital, have large cash flows, 
and perform a wide variety of services, including the sale of goods and 
offering of services unrelated to their charitable goals.
24
 Naturally, these 
activities fall squarely within the goals of traditional corporations.
25
 
These activities, while ultimately leading to charitable purposes, do not 
necessarily do so within the meaning of the IRC’s exclusive charitable 
activity requirement.
26
 One way to characterize many social businesses is 
that they are companies that would have qualified as tax-exempt 
organizations under the old income destination test that was eliminated 
over a half century ago.
27
 Since that time, although social businesses 
persist, Congress has not developed a way to recognize and reward for-
profit social enterprise in the tax code. Entrepreneurs have devised 
alternative, self-regulating business models to accomplish the beneficial 
aspects of obtaining tax-exempt status.
28
 They have also sought non-tax 
benefits of social entrepreneurship, which include a competitive 
advantage.
29
 However, if social business truly act charitably then they 
should be conferred some tax advantages as well. 
This Article considers the possibility of reincorporating a social 
 
23. YUNUS, supra note 15, at 120. 
24. Yunus’ Grameen Bank is an example, having approximately 1.7 billion dollars 
in revenue in 2010 (stemming largely from private sources, especially in its early days). 
See Balance Sheet of Grameen Bank (1983-2010) in USD, GRAMEEN BANK, 
http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=179&Item 
id=424 (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). 
25. As one social business manager has noted, the social business can sometimes 
perform profit-maximizing activities easier because actors are invested in the social 
cause. See Rodney Schwartz, Is There an Alternative to the Big Society?, TELEGRAPH 
(Feb. 17, 2011, 6:29 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/8331664/Is-there-an-
alternative-to-the-Big-Society.html. 
26. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2011). 
27. See Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 301, 331, 64 Stat. 906, 947, 
957 (1950) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
28. B-corporations are examples of such businesses. See CERTIFIED B CORP., 
http://www.bcorporation.net/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). Also notable are L3Cs (low-
profit limited liability companies), which are rapidly increasing in popularity. See AMS. 
FOR COMMUNITY DEV., http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/ (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2011). 
29. Enterprises See a Competitive Advantage in Social Responsibility, INTER-
AMERICAN DEV. BANK (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2009-
12-02/enterprises-see-a-competitive-advantage-in-social-responsibility,6023.html. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/7
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business as a tax-exempt nonprofit. An analysis of the costs and benefits 
is performed with an eye toward federal tax law. First, I discuss the 
potential problems with running a social business as an exempt 
nonprofit. There are federal regulations that get in the way of making this 
a savvy decision. Second, I posit that a social business can benefit from 
devising a parallel exempt organization with similar or identical 
charitable goals. There are a few ways to do this and I consider the pros 
and cons. Finally, I consider the practical hurdles that social businesses 
face by maintaining and operating tax-exempt organizations within the 
context of how social businesses have positive consequences for global 
development. 
 
II. The Framework 
 
In order to follow through with the analysis, this Article envisions a 
hypothetical social business that (1) purchases relatively low-cost goods 
(“goods”) produced by low-income producers (“producers”) substantially 
above the prevailing market rate; (2) sells these goods in a new, 
comparatively affluent market for a substantial profit; and (3) returns a 
vast majority of these profits back to indigent suppliers by providing a 
growing, consistent revenue stream of purchases (“reinvestment”). In 
other words, the charitable purpose of the social business is to loyally 
provide a monopsony for goods at a higher return for the producers. 
Essentially, this reinvestment spurs development and leads to economic 
growth for the producers. 
Depending on how such a framework is implemented, the sale of 
goods might not necessarily deviate substantially from the charitable 
purpose of the organization.
30
 This means that some social businesses 
could qualify for a tax exemption without incurring UBIT. However, this 
would be unlikely and the problem looms for many social businesses that 
engage in unrelated trade or business or simply raise capital.
31
 
Substantial deviations from the exempt purpose would create a major 
problem if the social business was an exempt.
32
 
 
 
30. See § 513. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d) (1983). 
31. See Hadley Rose, Comment, The Social Business: The Viability of a New 
Business Entity Type, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 131, 142 n.74 (2007). 
32. Indeed, it would threaten the exempt status of the organization. See discussion 
supra Part I. 
5
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III. Can a Social Business Be a Federal Tax-Exempt Nonprofit? 
 
I only consider nonprofits to be those that have qualified, sought, 
and obtained exempt status under IRC 501(c)(3) as public charities. 
Although exemption from taxes is a major, if not sole, factor in seeking 
exempt status, not all nonprofits qualify for or obtain the special tax 
exemption.
33
 Those that do not obtain exemption unfortunately cannot 
benefit from the crux of this Article. 
In order to become tax-exempt IRC 501(c)(3) public charities, there 
are several requirements social businesses must meet.
34
 Paperwork and 
patience form the bulk of it. While state law is what governs nonprofit 
status, a separate application governs the exemption conferred by the 
federal government. An exempt can pool and spend money more 
efficiently toward its charitable goal.
35
 Controversially, the exemption 
has been thought of as a subsidy to companies that are doing “good” for 
American society.
36
 While a wonderful concept, little legislative history 
exists to back this claim.
37
 Tax exemptions have also consistently been 
thought of as a privilege or boon given by the federal government.
38
 
There are also state tax benefits that arise from being organized as a 
nonprofit under state law.
39
 This often includes exemption from sales tax, 
which can boost revenue.
40
 
This Article will compare social businesses with what they could 
become—501(c)(3) public charities. If this were possible or beneficial 
 
33. There is no special requirement that compels a nonprofit to obtain federal tax-
exempt status. Presumably many nonprofits, which are stripped of (or never qualified for) 
exempt status, continue to operate under state nonprofit law. See A Short Guide to 
Vermont’s Nonprofit Corporations Law, VT. SECRETARY OF ST., http://www.sec.state.vt.u 
s/tutor/dobiz/noprof/noprofex.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). 
34. § 501(c)(3). 
35. ANTHONY MANCUSO, HOW TO FORM A NONPROFIT CORPORATION IN CALIFORNIA 
6 (Diana Fitzpatrick ed., 13th ed. 2009). 
36. Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit 
Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 301 (1976). 
37. Id. at 303. 
38. Id. at 342. 
39. See, e.g., Non-Profit/Exempt Organization, CAL. TAX SERVICE CENT., 
http://www.taxes.ca.gov/exemptbus.shtml/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). See also 
Corporate Income Tax: Exemptions, 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS (Thomson 
Reuters/West 2011), 0140 SURVEYS 5 (West) (listing the applicable law in each state). 
40. See generally Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, Exemption of Charitable or 
Educational Organization from Sales or Use Tax, 69 A.L.R.5th 477 (1999). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/7
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under the restrictions imposed largely by United States tax law, then an 
entire fleet of benefits, not merely financial in scope, would likely 
follow.
41
 However, the ultimate question is whether it is economically 
rational to convert a for-profit into a nonprofit for social businesses 
similar to the hypothetical discussed above. If not, then the alternatives 
should be seriously considered. 
 
1.  Reorganization 
 
A social business must first convert itself legally into a tax-exempt 
organization. Curiously, little has been written about converting a for-
profit business into a tax-exempt organization. The Model Nonprofit 
Corporations Act discusses how a nonprofit may convert into a for-profit 
under state law, but does not provide information regarding the 
converse.
42
 The Model Business Corporation Act is also silent on this 
matter.
43
 This may be because this conversion process rarely occurs or 
perhaps because the process may seem straightforward. 
The rarity of this conversion process may be because for-profits 
would rather donate a percentage of their profits to charities than deal 
with the paperwork of becoming tax-exempt. Assuming a for-profit is 
willing to become tax-exempt, donations possess the tax benefit of 
amounting to corporate tax deductions, over and above ordinary 
operating expenses.
44
 These charitable donations can be written off 
during the tax year in which the donations occurred.
45
 It is simply not 
important for companies whose primary output is human capital to seek 
exemption. Furthermore, exempt status cannot circumvent federal 
income tax for employees. 
In order for a for-profit to convert itself to an exempt, it would need 
board approval to incorporate as a separate nonprofit under state law.
46
 
This traditionally involves filings with the state’s secretary of state, to 
 
41. The benefits of becoming a nonprofit begin with income tax exemptions; 
however, there are several other ancillary benefits, including, for example, improved 
public image from simply declaring 501(c)(3) status. See I.R.C. § 501(a) (West 2011). 
42. See MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 9.30-9.34 (2008). 
43. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 12 (2007) (governing the disposition of assets) 
(amended 2008). 
44. I.R.C. § 170 (West 2011). 
45. Id. 
46. 8 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 3993.50 (West 2012). 
7
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form and legitimize the corporation.
47
 Essentially two companies would 
exist on the books at the same time for a short duration before the for-
profit is dissolved pursuant to its articles of incorporation.
48
 Both 
shareholders and the board of directors must agree that conversion is in 
the best interest of the corporation.
49
 Once the newly formed nonprofit is 
given approval by the IRS for exempt status (in this case as a public 
charity), it then becomes a requirement for the for-profit to donate (or 
sell) the assets in its entirety to the newly formed exempt organization. 
While the process might sound deceptively simple, it would require 
more than merely the will of the for-profits’ owners. The entire process 
may be everything but hassle free if the social business has significant 
assets, debts, and liabilities. The self-interest of directors and 
shareholders can effectively prevent the conversion of a corporation, and, 
at the very least, it seems that interested shareholders may be able to 
prevent the conversion.
50
 If shareholders assert rights to the fair market 
value of their shares, then the corporation may effectively become 
bankrupt, leaving nothing to capitalize the new exempt.
51
 This extreme 
circumstance is indicative of how difficult it is to alter corporate status 
quo. 
 
2.  Fulfilling the Organizational but Failing the Operational 
Test 
 
In order to form and survive, exempts must satisfy both an 
organizational as well as an operational test.
52
 The organizational test is 
generally a nonissue and determined by the paperwork filed, as well as 
 
47. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, STARTING AND MANAGING A NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION: A 
LEGAL GUIDE 133 (5th ed. 2009). 
48. 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 916 (2011). 
49. One can imagine how difficult it might be if the corporation is even modestly 
lucrative. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 12.01 (2008). Presumably, shareholders would 
put up a fight to dissolve the corporation because conversion would not be in line with 
the desire to maximize profit. 
50. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 275(b) (2011) (indicating that shareholders have a say 
in corporate dissolution). 
51. Colin T. Moran, Why Revlon Applies to Nonprofit Corporations, 53 BUS. LAW. 
373, 382 (1998). 
52. See Treas. Reg. § 1-501(c)(3)-1 (as amended in 2008). Further, as an example 
of how these tests have traditionally been employed, see Columbia Park & Recreation 
Ass’n v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1, 13 (1987). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/7
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the articles of incorporation.
53
 The operational test is fact-intensive and 
poses a larger problem. The fact-intensive inquiry is based upon the 
actual business dealings of an exempt, as opposed to merely looking at 
the intent of the creators in the filing documents.
54
 Satisfying the 
operational test for the IRS is crucial to maintaining exempt status, but 
also is a substantial loophole for social businesses. Case law has made it 
extremely difficult to understand what factors go into the test, however it 
is clear that no factor is dispositive and new factors can be considered as 
needed.
55
 
A for-profit social business will not satisfy the operational test 
because its goals are inherently not exclusively charitable. Social 
businesses serve profit motives in addition to charitable outcomes. Any 
single non-exempt purpose will eliminate the possibility that a social 
business can be a tax-exempt.
56
 It is easy to see that a social business will 
fail the operational test due to the facts and circumstances that make it 
profitable for owners while simultaneously contributing to a charitable 
cause.
57
 
If we assume that the social business is purchasing goods at above-
market rate, this additional revenue to the producer should ideally be 
considered a donation. The current tax law does not permit such a 
transaction to be considered a charitable donation, but rather deems it a 
purchase and sale.
58
 Under tax regulations, the only deductible portion of 
charitable contributions is that which is above and beyond the prevailing 
market rate of the good or service purchased.
59
 Therefore, a social 
business is unable to deduct the full value of its inventory cost because it 
likely spent fair market value on the goods as a market buyer. 
In the hypothetical presented above, the social business’ purchase of 
goods at above-market rate is considered to be merely an expense to the 
 
53. See Nat'l Found., Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 486, 491 (1987); Treas. Reg. § 
1.501 (c)(3)-1 (as amended in 2008). 
54. See B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 352 (1978); Jessica Peña & 
Alexander L.T. Reid, Note, A Call for Reform of the Operational Test for Unrelated 
Commercial Activities in Charities, 76 N.Y.U L. REV. 1855, 1868 (2001). 
55. See, e.g., Nonprofits’ Ins. Alliance of California v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 
277, 284 (1994). 
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(b)(4) (as amended in 2008) (indicating that one 
nonexempt purpose—even when mingled with exempt purposes—voids exempt status). 
57. See Peña & Reid, supra note 54, at 1872-74. 
58. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (West 2011). 
59. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 526, 
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 3 (2010). 
9
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business. Any proceeds from the sale of those goods simply offset the 
additional cost to the business. Ultimately, the charitable goal is 
unrecognized, and therefore the social business fails to engage in a 
charitable activity in its operation with respect to that transaction.
60
 
Conversely, the nonprofit would be able to benefit financially from the 
entire transaction being tax-free and completely related to its charitable 
purpose. This is an odd result, because in both corporate situations the 
results are charitable and only the effect upon the tax situation of the 
companies is altered. 
The irony in this is that in this hypothetical a social business, as 
compared to a nonprofit, has the potential to do far greater “good” in 
total pecuniary benefit to the producer.
61
 This is because, while a 
nonprofit has to depend on donors, members, grants, and other forms of 
support, the social business is purely market-based. If the social business 
thrives, then the producers gain tremendously through direct revenue. An 
effective social business can create social benefits that rival the salaries 
(and bonuses) of top executives on an annual basis. The fact that the 
operational test would fail means that the social business would struggle 
to convert into an exempt. 
 
3.  Lack of True Ownership and Control 
 
Another problem with converting a social business into a tax-
exempt organization is that an exempt is not “owned” by anyone.62 
Board members may feel like they own the exempt organization, but as a 
matter of law they do not. There are generally no shares of stock in a 
nonprofit.
63
 Also, there is a requirement that no individual benefits from 
 
60. See Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm’r, 950 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1991). In that case, an 
exempt sold groceries which were essential to their religious practice. The sale of 
groceries was substantially related to the religious purpose, but the business also had a 
profit motive. However, the appellate court was unable to grapple with the ostensibly 
commercial nature of the business. I would argue that the Living Faith grocery store is an 
example of a social business that was unrecognized in the revenue code. 
61. The Concept of L3C, AMS. FOR COMMUNITY DEV., http://www.americansforcom 
munitydevelopment.org/concept.php (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
62. See 1 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: LAW & TAXATION § 1:1 (West 2011); 
Nonprofit Organization, CITIZEN MEDIA L. PROJECT, http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-
guide/nonprofit-organization (last updated Feb. 3, 2009). 
63. Nonprofit Organization, supra note 62. Some states do allow shares of stock in 
nonprofits. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1602 (West 2012). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/7
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any transaction.
64
 The lack of an equity-based return is a serious 
detriment to the nonprofit business model. Some nonprofit directors 
choose not to receive compensation.
65
 As a result, key corporate actors 
are generally not provided with any reward.
66
 This provides a strong 
disincentive to innovate beyond the reasonable compensation that is 
allowed.
67
 This can dissuade many social business entrepreneurs who are 
interested in being well compensated for their charitable efforts or who 
compete with businesses in which their own financial status can 
determine the relative likelihood of their success. 
An exempt organization cannot exist beyond the scope of its 
mandate.
68
 Specifically, once the money supply is gone the nonprofit 
ceases to exist. Once the individuals who maintained the exempt are 
deceased, there is nothing tangible to exist into perpetuity.
69
 While board 
members may have agreed upon rights to succession, and perhaps even 
wrote a procedure for dissolving the exempt, the fact that there is no 
personal ownership is profound. The federal tax regulations mandate that 
assets cannot be transferred among the board or members, which speaks 
to the fact that the directors of a nonprofit do not generally exert 
“personal control” over matters.70 The lack of a personal stake in the 
outcomes of the organization ideally means that individual interests are 
truly altruistic, regardless of the reality of this ideal. Such severe 
restrictions upon exempt organizations make it an unsuitable model for 
social businesses, which are ostensibly retail in character. 
 
64. See Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 62. Again, while some states may 
permit stock ownership; most nonprofits are deemed non-stock corporations. 1 FLETCHER 
CYC. CORP. § 68.05 (West 2012). 
65. See BROADSOURCE & INDEP. SECTOR, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Implications 
for Nonprofit Organizations, BOARDSOURCE (2003) http://www.boardsource.org/dl.asp?d 
ocument_id=558. 
66. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A) (West 2011); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(1) (2002). 
Intangible rewards are hard to quantify. If the principal director of a nonprofit gets public 
accolades for her work, is she in violation of the private inurement doctrine? 
67. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
68. See Internal Revenue Manual—7.25.2 Single Parent Title Holding 
Corporations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-025-
002.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2011). 
69. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 12.03 (2008) (indicating that assets dedicated 
to a charitable purpose cannot be diverted to serve another purpose). 
70. See Martin J. Trupiano, Nonprofit Directors: IRS Raises the Governance Bar, 
LAW OFFICES MARTIN J. TRUPIANO, (2008), http://www.mtrupianolaw.com/uploads/IRS_ 
Raises_the_Governance_Bar.pdf. IRS Form 990 is an example of how the IRS has sought 
to make the role of directors more transparent. 
11
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The lack of an ownership stake in an exempt demands that the 
exempt have an inflexible business model. Ownership provides personal 
financial involvement and interest in obtaining a return on investment. 
This is especially true because if the goals of the social business change, 
it becomes difficult to alter the nature of the corporation to pursue new 
activities. This is perhaps why some social businesses have decided to 
not risk pursuing legitimacy as an exempt from the federal government.
71
 
The possibility of losing the flexibility that is inherent to business 
organizations in the United States is scary and sufficient to ward off 
potential do-gooders. 
The traditional exempt organization, devoid of any for-profit 
entanglements, would not struggle with many of these issues because its 
origin developed organically and not through the product of contrivance 
for exempt status. However, the converted social business may run into 
trouble if it is closely held and has an expectation to produce a certain 
amount of stable income for a small group of investors over the long 
term. These investors may have their whole lives staked in the business. 
If the exempt organization no longer has committed members, then day-
to-day operations of the social business could suffer. If corporate 
activities proceed downhill, dissolution or bankruptcy can become a 
reality. In fact, some state statutes prevent certain relationships among 
directors of a nonprofit.
72
 
An exempt organization’s assets cannot be sold and used for a non-
exempt purpose without incurring major tax liability as an excess benefit 
transaction.
73
 Because of this prohibitive rule, the social business 
nonprofit is compelled to use proceeds for charitable purposes.
74
 This is 
extremely difficult because the law is unsettled in how this might occur. 
Valuing a social business can end up posing a multi-million dollar loss 
for the initial group of investors who may have risked a substantial 
portion of their own money during the social business’ inception and 
would like to see some financial reward for their initial outlay.
75
 
 
 
71. See, e.g., Dana Brakman Resier, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2437 (2009) (recounting Google’s pursuit of for-profit philanthropy). 
72. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5227 (West 2011). 
73. I.R.C. § 4958(b) (West 2011) (referring to a 200 percent tax on excess benefit 
transactions that are uncorrected). 
74. See id. 
75. Because of the excess benefit tax, families cannot reasonably pass on a 
nonprofit. See id. 
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4.  Restrictions on Corporate Activity 
 
One major problem with converting a for-profit business into a 
nonprofit is the limitations on the types of activities an exempt business 
may perform. Charitable organizations must stick closely to the work 
defined in their charitable purpose stated in their articles of 
incorporation. Nonprofits that engage in activities that do not seem to 
relate to their charitable purpose are taxed on these so-called unrelated 
business transactions.
76
 If they become excessive, the nonprofit exempt 
status can be jeopardized.
77
 
This limitation is different from the standard applied in corporate 
law under traditional ultra vires activities because nonprofit exempts are 
subject to restrictive tax rules, which compel the organization to act only 
with respect to furthering the activities which benefit the charitable 
cause. Otherwise, they risk loss of its nonprofit status.
78
 The rationale 
behind the tax-based restriction on nonprofit activity is to ultimately 
ensure that the taxpayers as a whole are subsidizing only charitable work 
and not largely unrelated business. While all corporations must follow 
their articles of incorporation, exempts have more duties and restrictions 
imposed by the federal tax laws.
79
 The restriction on corporate activity 
makes the exempt more susceptible to dramatic loss of revenue for their 
operations because they are limited in how they can innovate. 
Exempt corporate activity is largely governed by the prohibition 
against self-dealing.
80
 To some extent, self-dealing has benefitted the for-
profit market, and perhaps shareholders tangentially.
81
 As for-profits, 
social businesses could also benefit from limited self-dealing.
82
 This is 
 
76. § 513. 
77. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (as amended in 2008); CELIA ROADY, UBIT 
PROBLEMS FOR TAX EXEMPT CHARITABLE TRUSTS 2 (2000), available at 
http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/A353BFFF-AA44-4FF3-AAE3C25E55A48AC3_Pu 
blication.pdf. 
78. James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 
237 (2003). The duty of obedience probably has a stronger tie to the ultra vires doctrine 
of corporate law. 
79. Hines et al., supra note 16, at 1191. 
80. See, e.g., Estate of Reis v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1016 (1986). 
81. The fact that jurisdictions often do not ban self-dealing is indicative of potential 
efficiencies contained within such transactions. See Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of 
Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 393, 401-5 
(2003). 
82. See generally Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(a)-1 (1973); Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(b)-1 (as 
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because self-dealing involves benefit to the individuals of the 
company—otherwise known as “disqualified persons.”83  
These people are also key stakeholders in the future and growth of 
the company and are oftentimes visionaries. In a stock-ownership 
context, if transparency exists, investors are likely to obtain a portion of 
the benefit from their investment relationship to a successful firm. This is 
not the case for exempts because of the lack of shareholders to “benefit” 
financially and the per se assumption that self-dealing violates the non-
distribution rule as well as the exclusive charitable purpose 
requirement.
84
 The lack of ownership and transparency of a nonprofit 
makes the exempt model more susceptible to malicious self-dealing. 
Self-dealing is generally considered a problem in business law, but 
the reality is that a board of directors of an exempt caught self-dealing 
will be financially injured in the long term. A social business may simply 
be able to walk away from the problem by removing the director and 
undoing the unfair transaction. Perhaps they would have to pay 
shareholders directly or through court order. However, an exempt would 
be attacked by the state as well as the federal government. This is 
because state attorney generals’ have the power to regulate exempts.85 If 
the exempt fails, then the goodwill of the company ceases to exist and is 
erased in an onslaught of negative media attention. 
 
5.  Inability to Deduct Monetized Social Benefits 
 
With no exempt status, our hypothetical social business is in a 
quagmire—potentially losing tax-deductible expenditures because it has 
no possibility of a tax deduction at all. It can donate a substantial sum of 
money to some other exempt “qualified organization” but it cannot do so 
within the exact meaning of its own goals as a social business. If the goal 
of the social business is to sell products at a substantial profit and then to 
return a vast percentage of those profits to the producers, it would fall 
afoul of the nonprofit rules. 
 
amended in 1986); Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(c)-1 (as amended in 2009); Treas. Reg. § 
53.4941(d)-1 (1973); Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(e)-1 (amended in 1986); Treas. Reg. § 
53.4941(f)-1 (amended in 2009). 
83. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3 (2002). 
84. The nature of self-dealing is conferring a private benefit and this violates the 
principle that any profit in an exempt be directed to an exempt purpose. 
85. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 610 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 
2011). 
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In other words, a social business is punished for its explicit profit 
motive which underlies the overarching goal of maximizing social 
welfare. One goal of working with an exempt is that a social business 
would be able to deduct the charitable portion of its work.
86
 While the 
IRC specifies a charitable deduction limit for corporations, at least some 
percentage of a social business’ charitable work would be recognized in 
the form of a tax break. It is from this core benefit that the notion of 
managing an exempt in conjunction is born and discussed herein. 
 
6.  Tax Liabilities Increase 
 
What remains, however, are the tax implications of running a social 
business as an exempt. On paper, reorganization is possible and, while 
difficult, may be worthwhile for some social businesses. Perhaps the 
initial group of investors could eschew any personal and financial reward 
they may obtain from the sale of the business after they are gone, but 
there are issues with increased tax liability. The increase in liability is 
comparable to a social business merely donating a percentage of its 
profits to a nonprofit. 
One major point of concern for social businesses is the prohibition 
on conducting activities that would produce ongoing income obtained 
from trade or business activities that are not substantially related to the 
charitable goal.
87
 For example, if corporations raise money through 
regularly performed fundraising events that involve the sale of goods not 
related to benefitting the stated class of individuals, then income from 
that activity is ultimately reduced by the UBIT liability.
88
 Federal tax law 
conceptualizes these activities as, among other things, not being 
motivated for charity because they compete with for-profits engaging in 
the same business.
89
 This problem should be analyzed in depth whenever 
conceptualizing the work of an exempt organization. 
Significant UBIT (also known as Unrelated Business Taxable 
Income, or UBTI) may even pose a threat to the exempt status of a 
nonprofit social business.
90
 This would occur when the UBTI begins to 
 
86. I.R.C. § 183 (West 2011). 
87. §§ 511-512. 
88. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 598, TAX ON 
UNRELATED BUSINESS OR INCOME OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 3, 8 (2010). 
89. See H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319 (1950) (indicating that unfair competition was key 
in passing the unrelated business taxable income rules). 
90. § 501(c)(3) (indicating that a nonprofit charitable organization must be 
15
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become a “substantial” portion of the total income.91 Merely producing 
income from the sale of goods would not jeopardize tax-exempt status, 
so long as the activities do not become “substantial.”92 What 
“substantial” means in monetary terms is still a mystery; however the 
IRS has determined that “substantial lobbying” probably means more 
than 20 percent of the exempt purpose expenditures.
93
 While this value is 
not on-point for the analysis of what constitutes “substantial” for the 
hypothetical exempt organization, it provides a yardstick of what the IRS 
perhaps believes to be significant. In other words, it is prudent for an 
exempt to not permit UBTI to exceed a quarter of annual revenue 
generated. 
 
IV. Operating a Nonprofit in Parallel with a Social Business 
 
Why would social businesses want to simultaneously run an exempt 
charity? First, the tax rules for social businesses are the same as for any 
other for-profit corporation and therefore there are no special tax benefits 
for maximizing social benefit as opposed to profit. This has already 
created a disincentive to “do good.” It poses a problem for competition 
because businesses are often engaged in the same activities in which 
exempt charities are engaged.
94
 The disparity may create a financial 
incentive to subject a corporation to additional regulations as an exempt, 
absent the retail work of the business. 
Scholars argue that the exempt entity is not as efficient as a for-
profit simply for the reason that the profit motive does not have a well-
defined incarnation in a nonprofit.
95
 At least one problem with nonprofits 
is that they are expected to profit for their cause but cannot engage in 
profit motives. That makes the nonprofit exempt inherently 
uncompetitive in a market filled with for-profits. The inefficiency of 
lacking a profit motive means that it would not be wise to eliminate the 
for-profit, but at the same time managers want public support and 
positive media attention that exempt organizations often receive. 
 
“exclusively” operated for its charitable purpose). 
91. Id. See also Living Faith Inc. v. Comm’r, 950 F.2d 365, 370 (7th Cir. 1991). 
92. Treas. Reg. § 1-501(c)(3)-1 (as amended in 2008). 
93. § 4911(c)(2) (specifically for organizations operating with a revenue of less 
than five million dollars). 
94. See Michael S. Knoll, The UBIT: Leveling an Uneven Playing Field of Tilting a 
Level One?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 857 (2007). 
95. Hines et al., supra note 16, at 1192. 
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More to the point, many social businesses could not run themselves 
as exempts because of their low profit margins.
96
 While profit is 
theoretically on the agenda, social business profit tends to be essentially 
ancillary to the social goal and therefore social businesses are profiting 
by a shoestring.
97
 By running a parallel exempt corporation, a social 
business can begin to take advantage of its role by utilizing tax benefits 
the law recognizes. It will alleviate some accounting issues as well. It is 
not uncommon for for-profit business leaders to sit on multiple boards, 
including those of nonprofits.
98
 Having multiple opportunities to connect 
with wealthy donors and other like-minded corporations can be 
beneficial. 
Managing an exempt, if done effectively, should allow a social for-
profit business to take tax deductions for the monetary portion of its 
giving per year, if the giving can be monetized.
99
 This would allow for 
both a tax deduction as well as a lowering of its tax base, the limit being 
10 percent of the annual taxable income.
100
 Contributions for 
corporations can carry over for five consecutive tax years.
101
 This is 
wonderful for a social business, because while it will be unable to deduct 
the total contributions per year, it can develop a carryover balance, which 
will persist for a statutory period of fifteen years.
102
 The deduction 
reserve balance will presumably be helpful for the business during less 
profitable years. 
 
1. Benefits of a Nonprofit at a Glance 
 
Exempt organizations can be a lot of work to incorporate and 
operate. However, an exempt organization should do more for the social 
business than simply accepting profits. The exempt’s goals should work 
 
96. Exempts are often funded heavily on contributions such as grants which social 
businesses cannot woo. See § 170(c)(2). 
97. YUNUS, supra note 15, at 114. 
98. See Making Nonprofit Partnerships Effective, BOARDSOURCE, http://www.board 
source.org/Spotlight.asp?ID=116.375 (last visited Nov. 23, 2011); see also GRANT 
THORNTON, NOT-FOR-PROFIT BOARDMEMBER HANDBOOK 31 (2011), available at 
http://www.grantthorton.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Not-for-profit%20organizations/Board% 
20member%20handbooks/NFP%20booklet%20-%20FINAL.pdf. 
99. See generally § 162. 
100. § 170(b)(2)(A). 
101. § 170(d)(2)(A). 
102. Id. 
17
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in tandem with the social business. It would provide a positive public 
relations outlet for the for-profit and could be able to solicit donations 
and contributions stemming from its 501(c)(3) status.
103
 It would be able 
to raise capital for charitable purposes through funding from private 
grants and provide an outlet for interested parties and investors to serve 
as leaders of the nonprofit board.
104
 Many public charities seek out 
powerful socialites or recognized figures to serve on the board of 
directors in order to make connections and obtain charitable gifts. 
Charities often make inroads with politicians and lobbyists, seeking to 
alter the law within the constraints of 501(c)(3). 
The exempt would also be able to benefit from passive investments 
without incurring UBIT, which can in turn be used to further the goals of 
the exempt and the for-profit.
105
 The exempt organization can seek out 
volunteers to assist in the activities in which the social business would 
have engaged.
106
 This leads to the final controversial point: the exempt 
organization may be able to increase the profitability of the social 
business by supplanting some of the “social” roles that it otherwise 
engages in. 
 
2. Methods of Utilizing or Implementing a Nonprofit 
 
There are at least two principal ways of pairing a nonprofit with a 
social business. One model would be to have an exempt nonprofit own 
and operate the social business entity. I call this the “nonprofit parent 
model.” Another method would be to have the for-profit manage an 
exempt organization. This I note as the “social business mutual benefit 
model.” Both methods accomplish many of the same financial desires, 
but they have different corporate and tax ramifications. Each method is 
better suited to the unique needs of a social business. Because a non-
stock nonprofit corporation has no true owners, the social business 
 
103. For-profits are also free to solicit donations, but the likelihood of individuals 
making such a donation is minimal. 
104. Many grants are solely awarded to 501(c)(3) public charities. See generally 
Advanced Search, GRANTS.GOV, http://www.grants.gov/search/advanced.do;jsessionid=b 
WGLTmpSjQtvpN2TDJ2bW4cHsscQz3GLxNVBMt2nJQJnmsvHJLpS!-1373114776 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2011) (allowing searches for current and archived federal grants 
that are available to 501(c)(3) charities (some of which are restricted solely to 501(c)(3) 
charities)). 
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1 (1992). 
106. § 513(a)(1). 
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directors instead would carefully select individuals who would be loyal 
to both the social business and the nonprofit goals, to ensure that the 
organizational charitable purpose of the exempt is essentially identical to 
that of the social business. Although exempt organizations tend to have 
distinct names, the corporate name of the social business could even be 
shared pursuant to fictitious name rules.
107
 
 
3. Nonprofit Parent Model 
 
The nonprofit parent model would have been an ideal model before 
the 1950s. This is because Congress passed the UBIT tax rules for 
exempt organizations only after that time. This scenario would have the 
social business sending all the profits over to the exempt organization 
and thereby totally avoiding tax liability on the charitable contributions 
under the destination of income test.
108
 The social business would 
therefore be a “feeder” corporation for the nonprofit exempt. This model 
was perfect and social enterprises in foreign jurisdictions that permit 
such a corporate relationship should utilize this method. 
Today, this set-up is highly restrictive for the social business 
because UBIT would be assessed against the nonprofit for its ownership 
stake in the for-profit business.
109
 For example, if the social business ran 
a macaroni factory, the sale of that good probably does not advance the 
charitable purpose of the exempt parent.
110
 Indeed, if all the nonprofit did 
was simply accept money from the feeder and pour it into a charitable 
cause, its nonprofit status could be in jeopardy.
111
 This is unfortunate 
because the social business should be free to do what it pleases, within 
the confines of legal corporate action, to product profits for the nonprofit 
parent. 
There is a not-so clever way to circumvent this problem, but it could 
require significant administrative burden. This would require that the 
social business sell goods and services which advance the charitable 
 
107. 6 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 2442 (West 2011). 
108. §§ 512-514. See also United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 
(1986). 
109. UBIT would be assessed assuming that some unrelated business is conducted. 
110. This is a famous reference in nonprofit law. See C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm’r, 
190 F.2d 120, 121 (3d Cir. 1951). 
111. § 501 (permitting such conduct would violate the “exclusive” purpose clause 
of the statute which bore the “operational test”). See also Treas. Reg. § 1-501(c)(3)-1 (as 
amended in 2008). 
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purpose of the nonprofit parent—that is, it substantially advances the 
goals directly as opposed to simply via financial backing. For example, a 
nonprofit dedicated to elevating the economic status of certain 
craftspeople could legitimately own a social business whose sole purpose 
is to sell the products produced by the very same artisans.
112
 
Then there is the clever method to circumvent the problem. The 
following suggestion is viable only for larger social businesses with the 
wherewithal to manage a complex business. The nonprofit would have to 
set up some sort of intermediate corporation in order to avoid triggering 
excessive UBIT liability or revocation of exempt status. This “blocker” 
corporation would perhaps be a limited liability company (LLC) whose 
sole purpose is to “shield” the nonprofit from UBIT. It is imaginable that 
many nonprofits are not going to appreciate having to set up something 
like this. The LLC would also have to be set up as a corporation rather 
than a partnership to avoid pass-through taxation.
113
 This is possible 
under state law where the incorporator can elect a taxation preference.
114
 
This intermediary corporation would be able to solve some other 
problems as well, and should carry on some other legitimate business 
purpose. This business purpose would be hard to define in the abstract, 
but at least its presence would not require a new payroll. 
 
4. Maximizing the Blocker LLC 
 
The blocker LLC’s ability to benefit the organization depends on 
the size of the social business. The exempt organization should utilize the 
LLC to engage in substantial investments. The LLC intermediary would 
not escape standard corporate tax rates on whatever activities it engages 
in.
115
 The rule on passive income is that it will not trigger UBIT for the 
nonprofit exempt if it is not commercial in nature.
116
 While active 
 
112. See Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 202 (1978). 
113. There is a presumption that state LLC statutes organize members as a 
partnership for tax purposes. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and 
Application of Limited Liability Company Acts—Issues Relating to Formation of Limited 
Liability Company and Addition or Disassociation of Members Thereto, 43 A.L.R.6th 
611 (2008). 
114. See Limited Liability Company, CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, 
http://www.ftb.ca.gov/businesses/bus_structures/LLcompany.shtml (last visited Nov. 25, 
2011). 
115. Limited Liability Companies are treated as corporations when they elect to be 
taxed independently. See 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limited Liability Companies § 1 (2011). 
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(a)(1) (1992). 
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management of investments may constitute UBIT, shifting the 
investment task to another company would be permissible without 
jeopardizing exempt status.
117
 
Nonprofits cannot themselves engage in so-called “debt-financed” 
or leveraged investments.
118
 However, the nonprofit can circumvent the 
prohibition against margin trading by using the LLC to engage in 
derivatives or securities investment.
119
 This would leverage cash coming 
in from the for-profit and presumably significantly increase it.
120
 The 
goal of debt-financed investments has been deemed by courts to be a 
profit motive.
121
 Therefore, this intermediary accomplishes debt-financed 
investing without having to subject the exempt parent to UBTI 
liability.
122
 Because the LLC is a separate legal entity, it does not affect 
the exempt status of the parent. 
Depending on the financial circumstances, the exempt organization 
may prefer to simply partake in passive investments on its own without 
bothering with the intermediary. A nonprofit exempt is permitted to 
invest its capital in securities which would be otherwise taxed for a social 
business.
123
 This theoretically results in a net gain for social businesses, 
which allows them to contribute more money to charities. 
 
5. The Problems with the Nonprofit Parent Model 
 
Ultimately, the nonprofit parent model is a bit too unwieldy to be 
applied to small and medium-sized social businesses. This rests largely 
on the fact that a nonprofit which owns a social business cannot gain 
 
117. MORGAN LEWIS, ACCOMMODATING TAX-EXEMPT INVESTORS: UNDERSTANDING 
UBTI 3 (2012), available at http://www.morganlewis.com/documents/VCPEFdeskbook/ 
VCPEFdeskbook_AccommodatingTaxExemptInvestors.pdf. 
118. See Bartels Trust ex rel. Univ. of New Haven v. United States, 209 F.3d 147 
(2d Cir. 2000). 
119. See id. 
120. While the S&P 500 index has performed poorly in the past decade, during 
positive times gains are significant. See Floyd Norris, A Historical Cycle Bodes Ill for the 
Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 6, 2012, at B3. 
121. See Bartels Trust, 209 F.3d at 155. 
122. I.R.C. § 514 (West 2011). See also Bartels Trust, 209 F.3d at 155 (explaining 
that debt-financed investments trigger UBTI). 
123. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f) (as amended in 2011). In many instances, at least 
33.33 percent of an exempt’s revenue must arise from public support, through direct or 
indirect contributions from the general public, known as the “public support test.” See § 
1.170A-9(f)(1)(ii). 
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anything through tax planning if its desires are to utilize the social 
business for unrelated business activity. It would take a lot of careful 
planning and management of the social business to ensure its activities 
serve the social outcomes of the exempt. 
The nonprofit parent does not solve the problem of principal 
investors not being able to own the social business. This is because the 
social business must continue to be operated by the exempt.
124
 As a 
result, the nonprofit parent model is still plagued with problems that 
affect any transition from social business to a nonprofit exempt. For each 
corporate intermediary that gets added on, taxes are due, and UBIT 
issues could persist without respite. 
A minor problem exists regarding who controls the for-profit and 
the propriety of this control. It will not seem prudent if the directors of 
the nonprofit spend a considerable amount of time managing the for-
profit as opposed to managing the affairs of the nonprofit. While there is 
nothing to necessarily prevent a nonprofit from possessing a social 
business, many questions would be raised if the principal human actors 
in each organization were the same. In the extreme case, the social 
business could be thought of as a mere instrumentality of the 
nonprofit.
125
 A nonprofit that possesses a social business and is 
financially successful is not necessarily committing fraud.
126
 Although 
six-figure salaries are common for nonprofit directors, a court will not be 
reluctant to find foul play if salary increases as a result social business 
presence can be found.
127
 
Finally, in some states there is a minimum franchise tax which is a 
practical disincentive to create corporate intermediaries.
128
 Consider that 
nonprofits are often poorly funded, survive on thin budgets, and do not 
have the extra personnel to allocate to red tape. If the social business is 
not producing enough revenue to warrant substantial investments for 
 
124. If the social business is wholly owned and operated by the exempt, the exempt 
cannot simply sell its equity stake in the company without incurring taxes. It is treated as 
non-divertible property. 
125. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 260, 266 (D. Del. 1989). 
126. It is worth noting that a nonprofit is not barred from making a profit at all. See 
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 3.01-3.02 (2008); 1 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra 
note 64, at § 1:1. 
127. See CHARITY NAVIGATOR, 2010 CEO COMPENSATION STUDY 1 (2010), 
available at http://www.charitynavigator.org/__asset__/studies/2010_CEO_Compensatio 
n_Study_Revised_Final.pdf 
128. See, e.g., What Is the Minimum Franchise Tax?, CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, 
http://www.ftb.ca.gov/businesses/faq/712.shtml (last visited Nov. 25, 2011). 
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these intermediary corporate entities, then the nonprofit parent model is 
simply a bureaucratic nightmare which is not outweighed by its benefits. 
Many nonprofit exempts can avoid paying franchise tax.
129
 
 
6. Social Business Mutual Benefit Model 
 
The premise of the social business mutual benefit model is to 
convert social business made profits into federally recognized tax 
deductions by sending them over to a related exempt organization whose 
charitable goal is substantially the same as the social business. This 
model benefits the for-profit social business by utilizing the corporate 
charitable contribution tax deduction and the social business could 
deduct business expenses incurred by the nonprofit. It is also a more 
flexible model because it permits the social business to conduct a wide 
range of business activities which would have otherwise been considered 
unrelated in the nonprofit parent model. 
In the social business mutual benefit model, the social business has 
control over the exempt.
130
 This requires that members of the exempt 
organization’s board be carefully selected and vetted by the shareholders 
of the social business. Rather than the social business “giving away” the 
money to the supplier, either directly (as could happen for profit and loss 
rationales) or via increased purchase prices, a legally recognized 
nonprofit entity accepts the contribution.
131
 Here, taxpayers actually see a 
net benefit to governmental coffers to boot because, although the money 
is not taxed at the exempt end, the social business continues to pay taxes 
at the corporate taxation rate, less any deductions it is able to write-off. 
There is no UBTI complication. 
One advantage of this model is that it does not require the use of 
intermediary corporations. While extensive use of intermediary 
corporations can help solve business (usually tax) problems, they are not 
considered “ethical” in the eyes of some nonprofit directors and 
donors.
132
 These organizations may conflate what are commonplace in 
 
129. 1 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 64, at § 2:27. 
130. HOPKINS, supra note 47, at 59. 
131. I.R.C. § 170(h) (West 2011). It is important to note that one cannot deduct 
money given away to an individual. See § 170(c). For example, a donation to a homeless 
beggar, regardless of how destitute, is not contemplated as a charitable deduction under 
the plain language of the prevailing deductions provision. Id. 
132. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, I.R.S. Offers a Tougher Amnesty Deal for 
Offshore Accounts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011, at B3; Stephanie Strom, I.R.S. Takes on 
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the for-profit arena with greedy practices that they may associate only 
with business executives, regardless of legality of the practice. 
 
7. Benefits for the Social Business from the Presence of a 
Nonprofit 
 
Overall, the presence of an exempt nonprofit can tremendously 
benefit a social business’ charitable goal. However, other benefits are not 
immediately conspicuous. These include the ability to obtain grant 
funding for the charitable cause, name recognition, public support and 
recognition, and, controversially, enhanced profits for the social business 
itself. Public recognition is not something that would be possible simply 
among the for-profit sector for most social businesses. 
When a new exempt becomes successful, philanthropic circles focus 
their attention. After all, philanthropy is not totally altruistic—donors 
want to know their money is being used to a positive end. This leads to 
public media attention and increased competitiveness of the charitable 
goal. The intangible benefit of recognition is something that cannot be 
replicated with tax incentives. This is largely because the relationships 
that are formed by the presence of an exempt can provide a self-
sufficient monetary backbone for an exempt and may prop up the social 
business as well. 
The presence of an exempt can also ensure that operations that are 
exempt and non-exempt are kept separate. It cannot be undervalued that 
the social business mutual benefit model is an excellent choice for 
smaller operations because separate entities would force managers to 
keep separate books. The separation makes tracking and earmarking 
funds a simpler task for the organizations. Having separation also means 
dividing projects based on what organization would be better suited. 
Social businesses are better suited for retail than exempts, and therefore 
the clear separation of entities would further this end. 
 
8. Inurement or Private Benefit? 
 
Private benefit and inurement pose interesting problems for the 
social business parent model. Exempts cannot confer a private benefit 
 
Tax Abuse by Charity Support Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, at B1. Usually what 
makes this worse is incorporating intermediaries in other countries. 
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upon any single person or organization.
133
 This rule is quite old and 
relates back to the exclusive charitable purpose of an exempt and the 
rationales for providing tax exemption as a special benefit to the 
organization.
134
 Thus, if the nonprofit exempt is acting in a way that 
makes the social business more profitable, it is arguably conferring an 
impermissible private benefit upon the owners of the social business. 
While that does create a certain level of liability if the organization gets 
attention, the positive end is that it increases productivity of the for-profit 
without the need of any additional capital—human or financial. It can be 
said to relieve the burden incumbent upon the social business to carry out 
the benefits it seeks as well. The exempt would be managing the “social” 
end of the social business. 
There are two arguments that directors could use to avoid this 
problem. First, a substantial amount of directors should not sit on the 
boards of both the nonprofit exempt and the social business.
135
 It may be 
permissible for one or more individuals to be shared, depending on the 
size of the board. Having a board with more shared directors than the 
minimum number required would be preferable.
136
 This action would 
mitigate any private inurement issues. Second, it is important to show 
that any excess benefit is not accruing to the individual owners of the 
social business but to the hypothetical producers.
137
 Having a good 
portion of the board be unrelated by blood or marriage would also 
mitigate the notion that a benefit was being conferred upon 
individuals.
138
 
Finally, the mere presence of another company cannot reasonably 
be said to automatically create a private benefit because it may be argued 
that any nonprofit exempt may confer a private benefit on some for-
profit company or individual unrelated to that company. For example, if 
certain lending companies benefitted from the transactions of a nonprofit, 
would this be a private benefit? It seems that private benefit is quite an 
 
133. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Comm’r, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987); 
Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989). 
134. See Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Campbell, 181 F.2d 451, 458 (7th Cir. 1950) 
(indicating existence before 1950); Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, sec. 32, 28 Stat. 509, 
556-57 (1894); Treas. Reg. § 1.503(b)-1 (1976). 
135. See P.L.L. Scholarship Fund v. Comm'r, 82 T.C. 196, 200 (1984). 
136. Compare MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.03(a) (2008) (requiring at least 
three directors), with DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(b) (West 2011) (mandating a 
minimum of one director). 
137. See KJ'S Fund Raisers, Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 669 (T.C. 1997) 
138. Id. 
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extensive doctrine and hard to predict.
139
 Although the benefit doctrine is 
very much alive and well, it has yet to be applied in the novel context 
described above.
140
 
The IRS has been very active in stripping exempt status from 
organizations that violate the private benefit rule, and can do so because 
of the strict rule that a single non-exempt purpose, even insubstantial, 
can defeat exempt status for an organization.
141
 This rule originates from 
the notion that Congress confers a tax exemption to an organization as a 
privilege, not a right, and that any interpretation of applicable law will 
most likely be strictly construed, or at least given plain meaning.
142
 This 
is not to say that pursuing a federal tax exemption in the United States is 
impossible for a social business, but, depending on how large the social 
business ends up, the tax commissioner may begin to investigate the 
nature of the exempt and its business conduct. 
 
V. Ramifications for Development 
 
The foregoing discussion has been practical in nature. I hope it is 
beneficial to those considering the social business model for their own 
entrepreneurial endeavors. However, the implications of the social 
business model should enhance both an exempt’s charitable output as 
well as a social business’ profit and consequent charitable output. This 
combination theoretically presents a phenomenal outcome for self-
interested actors who still want to “do good,” but not at the expense of 
their quality of life. 
If anyone can claim to have implemented social development on a 
large scale, it is ironically the private sector. There has been discourse 
about such development in legal academia for decades.
143
 The United 
States has not only been reluctant to adopt the right to development 
recognized by the United Nations—it has not allocated resources to the 
 
139. See, e.g., Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1072-73 (1989) 
(indicating that the disproportional training of Republican candidates would confer a 
private benefit). 
140. HOPKINS, supra note 47, at 59. 
141. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201008050 (Feb. 26, 2010); HOPKINS, supra note 47, 
at 52. 
142. See Better Bus. Bureau of D.C. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1945). 
143. See, e.g., Philip Alston, Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the 
Right to Development, 1 HARV. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 3 (1988); Stephen Marks, The Human 
Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 137 (2004). 
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effort.
144
 Government apathy has not stymied the private sector’s drive 
for innovation. The social business model is apt for the private sector 
because it allocates rewards for efficient and superior management, while 
simultaneously recognizing the virtues of charitable giving on a much 
larger scale. The motto of social business gels well with the modern 
consumer conscience. 
An example of increased charitable output arises from the 
hypothetical symbiosis of the social business and the nonprofit exempt. 
The practical relationship between these two entities is governed by the 
transfer of cash between the social business and the exempt. From this 
transfer the profitability increases for the social business because the 
exempt benefits from an increase in capital for its charitable cause. The 
producers who are benefitting from the presence of the exempt improve 
their lives and, presumably, the output is used by the social business to 
turn a profit. Thus, the cycle can repeat itself, and an extremely 
sustainable model for development flourishes. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
While the tax code does not yet embrace social businesses as a 
charitable business model, it does not prevent creative implementation of 
a nonprofit exempt. While social businesses could theoretically convert 
themselves into nonprofits under state law, most will not generally 
qualify as federal tax exempts due to the harsh requirements. The current 
tax code does not make conversion a viable option for social businesses. 
Not only is it not lucrative to convert into a nonprofit exempt, it is also 
harmful for the social cause because exempt status brings with it severe 
restrictions that do not comport with retail commercial models. 
The solution is a two-part, symbiotic organization. It seems logical 
for small social businesses to manage an exempt company. This exempt 
company, owned by no one, would be dedicated to carrying out the goals 
of the social business. This exempt organization would act in ways that 
further the goals of the social business through contributions from the 
social business and other sources. The reverse is also a viable option for 
larger nonprofits that can afford to manage a wholly owned and operated 
social business. This structure may raise suspicion from regulators, but, 
if carefully operated, the business purpose of the social business could be 
tailored to avoid any excessive tax liability for the nonprofit. 
 
144. See Marks, supra note 143, at 152-53. 
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Finally, the social business model could accelerate the rate of global 
economic development while also aligning the financial incentives for 
developers. In a future with significant investment in social business, the 
shift can move away from microfinance and lending to larger-scale social 
enterprise. While there is a bright future for the social business model, 
there is no need to wait for the current legal regime to provide the correct 
incentives. 
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